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I. Introduction
The Social Security system might transform wholly or partially into an
individual account system wherein participants may invest some or all oftheir
investment assets in personal accounts. Ifthis transformation occurs, the par*
**
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ticipants will bear some degree of investment risk for their investment selections.Minimization
ofthe participants' investment risk is in the interest ofboth
the participants and the Social Security sponsor, the U.S. government. Participants need to protect their retirement assets from reduction or elimination and
the U.S. government does not want to have to provide retirement assets to
those unfortunate participants who make poor investment decisions.
This article will describe certain steps taken by the United States Department of Labor (DOL), pursuant to its authority under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),1 to address the issue of investment risk for participants covered by individual account pension plans in the
private sector. The DOL took these steps in the form of rulings and regulations issued in the past twenty years. These rulings and regulations provide
a model of "best practices" that one might consider adopting in the development of an individual account program for Social Security.
A Board of Trustees charged with fiduciary duties and responsibilities
could implement the adopted protective measures. Such a board might resemble the Federal Thrift Savings Board that oversees the Thrift Savings Plan,
which is an individual account plan for federal employees.2 Alternatively, the
board might resemble the State Board of Administration that will implement
and operate the Public Employee Optional Retirement Program (PEORP), an
individual account plan recently established in Florida for state employees?
If the Board approach is unacceptable, an existing or newly created federal
agency could assume responsibility for implementing protective measures.
f. DOL ERISA Protections- ERISA § 404(c) and the
GeneralFiduciaryStandardApplicable to the Selection ofInvestment
Options andService Providers

A. ERISA § 404(c)
In the case of a pension plan that provides for individual accounts and
allows a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the investment of
the participant's assets, compliance with § 404(c) would meanthat the participant or beneficiay would not be a fiduciary and that no other fiduciary would
be liable for any loss resulting from the exercise of such control.4 Although
the drafters of § 404(c) intended to protect plan sponsors from fiduciary
liability for investment decisions made by the sponsors' workers, the rules
1.
2.
3.
4.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8471-8479 (2000) (describing Thrift Savings Plan).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.4501(8) (West 2001).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994).
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adopted by the DOL to define the scope of § 404(c) create important protections for workers that substantially reduce investment risk.
A plan generally satisfies the requirements of ERISA § 404(c) ifthe plan
provides a participant or beneficiary with: (A) the opportumnityto exercise independent control over assets in his or her account, and (B) the opportunity to
choose, from a broad range of alternatives, the investment vehicle for the assets
in his or her account.5 The PEORP incorporates the § 404(c) regulations. 6
1. Opportunityto Exercise Control
A participant does not have the "opportunity to exercise control over
assets in his [or her] individual account" unless (1) the participant is given the
opportunity to provide investment instructions (in writing or otherwise with
the opportunity to receive written confirmation) to a plan fiduciary obligated
to carry out such instructions, and (2) the participant receives or has an opportunity to obtain information sufficient to make an informed investment
decision.7 However, a participant does not exercise "independent control in
fact" if the participant is subject to improper influence, f a plan fiduciary
conceals material non-public facts from the participant, or if the participant
is legally incompetent and the plan fiduciary accepts the participant's investment instruction with knowledge that the participant is legally incompetent."
a. Investment Instructions
Under an ERISA § 404(c) plan, a plan fiduciary generally must follow
the investment instructions of the participants or beneficiaries. However, a
plan may impose reasonable restrictions on the frequency of investment instructions as long as, with respect to each investment option, such restrictions
allow participants and beneficiaries to react with sufficient frequency to the
reasonably expected market volatility of a particular investment?
A plan must allow participants to provide investment instructions at least
quarterly with respect to three core investment options constituting a '"broad
range" of investments.10 However, if the plan allows participants to make
investment instructions with respect to any other investment option more
frequently (e.g., monthly), the plan must allow participants to provide invest5.

29 C..R § 2550.404c-l(b) (2000).

6.

RFA.STAT.ANN.§ 121.4501(15)(West2001).

7. 29 CYR. § 2550.404c-1(bX2Xi).
8. 29 C.R § 2550A04c-1(cX2).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(bX2Xhi(C).
10. 29 C.R. § 2550.404c-1(bX2Xi (CX1); see also infra Part ]IAl.a (discussing
fiduciaries' duties in selecting investment options).
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ment instructions with the same frequency for one of the broad range investments, or must allow the participant to transfer his or her assets from such
other investments into a low risk account (e.g., a money market account) and
from such low risk account into a broad range investment with the same frequency allowed for such broad range investments." If the plan allows participants to invest in employer securities, the participant must be able to provide
investment instructions with respect to all broad range investment options as
frequently as the participant may provide investment instructions with respect
to the employer securities, orthe participant must be able to transfer his or her
assets from employer securities into a low risk account and from such low risk
account into a broad range investment as frequently as the participant may
provide investment instructions for broad range investments. 2
A plan may charge the participant's accounts a reasonable expense for
executing the participant's investment instructions, provided that participants
periodically receive notice of such expense. 3 Although the plan fiduciary
who receives investment instructions from the participant or beneficiary has
a general obligation to carry out such instructions, the fiduciary may decline
to implement the instructions when such implementation would result in a
transaction prohibited by ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code, or would
generate taxable income to the plan. 4 A fiduciary may also decline to implement any investment instruction that does not accord with the terms of a plan
document or an instrument consistent with ERISA that would cause a fiduciary to own foreign assets in violation of ERISA, jeopardize the plan's tax
qualified status, or cause the participant to suffer excessive losses."
According to the DOL, when a plan provides participants the opportunity
to exercise control over their assets and to choose from a broad range of assets,
such plan would not lose its ERISA §404(c) status merely because a fiduciary
overrides an individual's investment instructions if continuing to follow such
instructions would not be prudent.' 6 However, the plan fiduciary's exercise
of control over the investment decision would supersede the individual's
exercise of control and the transactional relief under ERISA § 404(c) would
be unavailable. 1
11.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2XiiXCX2) (2000).
12. 29 C.F.. § 2550.404c-1(bX2XiiXCX3).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(A).
14. 29 C.FR. § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xii)(B).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(dX2Xii).
16. See Dept. of Labor Adv. Op. No. 96-02A (Feb. 9, 1996) (referring specifically to
situation in which fiduciary could not locate participant or beneficiary). It is unclear whether
the opinion applies with equal force to situations in which the participant or beneficiary is readily available. Id.
17. Id.
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b. Sufficient Investment Information
For purposes of ERISA § 404(c), a participant does not have "sufficient
investment information" unless an identified plan fiduciary makes certain
mandatory disclosures to the participant or beneficiary automatically and,
uponthe participant's request, provides certain additional investment information." Specifically, an identified plan fiduciary must disclose the following
information:
- A description of investment alternatives, including (a) general investment objectives, (b) risk and return characteristics, (c) type and
diversification of assets, (d) names of the investment managers, and
(e) transaction fees and expenses that directly affect the participant's
account balance19 (e.g., commissions, sales loads, and redemption or
exchange fees).
- An explanation of (a) the investment instruction-giving process,
(b) any limitation on investment instructions, and (c) any restrictions
on the exercise
of voting, tender, and similar rights under the invest°
ments.2
- The name,address, and phone number of the plan fiduciary responsible for making the required disclosures.2'
- If the plan allows participants directly or indirectlyto invest in employer securities, a description ofthe procedures established to maintain confidentiality with respect to the purchase, holding, and sale of
the securities and the exercise ofvoting, tender, and similar rights, as
well as the name, address, and phone number of the fiduciary responsible for monitoring compliance with the procedures.'
- A copy of the most recent prospectus for each available investment
option registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (provided before
or immediately after a participant first invests).
- Materials provided to the plan relating to voting, tender, or similar
rights under the plan.24
18. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(bX2Xi)(B) (2000).
19. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-1(bX2Xi)(BX1)Xii), (iii), (v).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2XiX13X1Xiv).
21. 29 CX.FL § 2550.404c-l(bX2)(i)(BX1Xvi).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2)(i)(BX1Xvii).
23. 29 C.ER. § 2550.404c-1(bX2Xi)(BX1Xviii) (2000). Some plan investment vehicles,
such as Common/Collective trusts, would not be described by a prospectus, and in that event,
this requirement is inapplicable. See 4 REM CH INST. OF Am, PENSION COORDINATOR
§ 54217 (2001), available at httpl//www.riacheckpointcom (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) (suggesting requirement extends only to investment alternatives subject to Securities Act of 1933).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(bX2X(BX1Xx) (2000).
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Upon request by a participant, the fiduciary must fiunish a participant or
beneficiary with the following information:
- The annual operating expenses for each selected investment (expressed
both in dollars and as a percentage of the average net asset value)2 *
- Copies of any prospectuses, financial statements and reports, or other
materials provided to the plan (including
a list of assets comprising the
26
portfolio of each investment option).
- Current values and historical investment performance, net of expenses,
of each investment option available under the plan, and the current
value of the shares or investment option interests held in the participant's account. 21
The regulations do not mandate specific procedures for plans providing
information to participants on request. According to the DOL, however, the
regulations describe the informational requirements in general terms "in order
to afford plan fiduciaries and plan sponsors the flexibility necessary to accomalternatives which may
modate the variations in plan design and investment
2
be available to participants and beneficiaries.11 8
Although the DOL encourages plan fiduciaries to provide investment
education services to participants, § 404(c) specifically disclaims any requirement that plan fiduciaries provide investment advice or investment education
to assist participants in making investment decisions.29 Provision of the
information specified by § 404(c) would appear to satisfy the disclosure
requirements of § 404(c). However, one court has suggested that relief under
ERISA § 404(c) is not available unless the plan provides information sufficient for an average participant to understand and assess matters such as the
following: the control that the plan permits the participant to exercise and the
financial consequences the participant assumes by exercising control, the rights
provided to participants and the obligations imposed upon fiduciaries, the
terms and operating procedures of the plan, the investment alternatives offered
under the plan and the investments in which assets of each fund are placed,
the financial condition and performance of the investments, and the developments that materially affect the financial status of the investments. 30 More
25. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BX2Xi).
26. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BX2Xil), (iii).
27. 29 C.FR. §§ 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BX2Xiv), (v).
28. Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906,46,912 (Oct 13,
1992) (codified at29 C.F.R. pt 2550).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(cX4) (2000). See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Participant Investment Education, 29 CFR. § 2509.96-1 n.1 (2000) (interpreting what information
constitutes investment advice and investment information).
30. See In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420,447 (3d Cir. 1966) (assessing prerequisites for fiduciary to prevail under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)).

ERISA PROTECTIONSAND SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION 1359
generally, courts have held that misinformation or a failure to provide relevant
information may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.3"
Another court has suggestedthat, in the case ofparticipant-directed plans,
ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions require that plan fiduciaries provide participants with notice and information about changes sufficient to allow
participants the opportunity to make investment decisions and to prevent them
from being misled or misinformed.32
2. Broad Range of Investments
An ERISA § 404(c) plan must permit participants to choose independently from among a '"broad range" of investment alternatives for the assets in
their individual accounts. The plan must allow participants to invest in a
number of investment options sufficient to give the participants a reasonable
opportunity to materially affect the potential return on their investments.33
According to the DOL, the selection or designation of investment alternatives
offered under a plan remains the responsibility of the fiduciaries of a participant-directed plan unless the plan permits participants to select any investment vehicle that is administratively available.
a. Core Investments
The plan must offer at least three "core" investment options, each of
which is diversified as to type of investment, has materially different risk and
return characteristics, and when aggregated together and with other investments available under the plan, allows participants to diversify their investments and minimize the overall risk of their account.3 Look-through investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, collective trusts, and pooled separate
accounts, qualify as "core" options, and in determining whether the plan satisfies the diversification requirements, one may consider the underlying assets
of such vehicles. 5
The authorizing statute for the Thrift Saving Plan does not incorporate
ERISA § 404(c) requirements. However, it limits investment choices. The
Board may invest in only five broad funds. In the case of the equities fund,
the investment must match a "commonly recognized index... which is a rea31.

See id. (citing various court decisions establishing that fiduciary obligations may im-

pose negative duty not to misinform and affirmative duty to inform under some circumstances).
32. See Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d. 720,735 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing fiduciary obligations ofnotice in making amendments to existing plan).
33.
34.
35.

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX3)(iXA) (2000).
29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-1(bX3Xi)(B).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX3Xii).
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sonably complete representation of the U.S. equity markets. 36 The Board of
the Thrift Savings Plan acts as a fiduciary when selecting these investments.
b. Self-DirectedBrokerage Options
The § 404(c) regulations provide that a minimum of three diversified
investment alternatives may satisfy the requirements, and thus the fiduciaries
of a § 404(c) plan may designate more than three investment alternatives.3"
In addition to, or as an alternative to, designating investment options, the plan
might include a self-directed brokerage option (SDO).
One type of SDO is a "mutual fund window," which allows participants
to direct the investment oftheir account balances among a universe of mutual
funds.3 9 In some cases, thousands of mutual funds might be available. Another type of SDO permits participants to open "brokerage accounts," and the
participants may direct a broker to invest individual plan assets in almost any
publicly traded securities.'
When a plan offers participants an SDO alternative, some of the protections afforded participants under the § 404(c) regulation may not apply.
For example, the § 404(c) regulations require that participants receive "information sufficient to make informed decisions with regard to investment alternatives available under the plan."4 The regulations identify the specific
information required and distinguish between "designated" and other investment alternatives. A "designated investment alternative is a specific investment identified by a plan fiduciary as an available investment alternative
under the plan."' Plan fiduciaries must automatically provide a description
of each designated investment alternative, including its investment objective,
its risk and return characteristics, and the type and diversification of its
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 8438 (bX2XA) (2000) (describing Common Stock Index Investment
Fund). The five options are a Government Securities Investment Fund, a Fixed Income Investment Fund, a Common Stock Index Investment Fund, a Small Capitalization Stock Index Investment Fund, and an International Stock Index Investment Fund. 5 U.S.C. § 8438(b)(1) (2000).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 8477(b)-(c) (2000).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX3)Q)(B) (2000).
39. Sef-DirectedBrokerageAccountsin Demand by Employees, Survey Finds,Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 22, 2001 ); Anne Willette, TrendsOften StartatBigFirms,USATODAY,
Nov.24, 1997, at3B.
40. Hearingon HR 2269, The Retirement SecurityAdviceAcA the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations, House Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong.,
available at http://www.edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/10th/eer/hr2269-71701/combs (last
visited Oct 23, 2001) (statement of Assistant Secretary Ann L. Combs, Pension & Welfare
Benefits Administration, Dep't of Labor); Willette, supra note 39, at 3B.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2)(B) (2000).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(X4).
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assets." A specific description of investment alternatives other than "designated investment alternatives" is not required." If an investment alternative

is not a "designated alternative," participants need receive automatically only
strictly limited information: a general description of the alternatives, i.e., the
types of investments available through the mutual fund window, and if the
participant invests in an investment alternative registered under the Securities
Act of 1933 (including any mutual fund), a prospectus." Any prospectuses,
financial statements, or reports furnished to the plan would still be provided
to participants upon request."

When a plan offers a very broad universe of investment alternatives, the
plan fiduciary should have neither a fiduciary responsibility to determine
whether investments selected by a participant are appropriate nor a duty to
monitor the participant's investment selection because the fiduciary arguably
does not "designate" any particular investment alternatives. Thus, when a plan
permits participants to invest through a brokerage account, the fiduciary
arguably has not designated any of the securities in such account. However,
when a plan offers a limited number of mutual funds under a mutual fund
window, the argument that such mutual funds are not "designated" may be
weaker. Although a plan fiduciary under ERISA § 404(c) might avoid the
automatic disclosure requirement if each security available in a brokerage
account or window is not a "designated investment," the DOL has not ad-

dressed this issue and might conclude otherwise.
B. GeneralERISA FiduciaryStandardsApplicable to the Selection of
Investment Options andService Providers
The general fiduciary standards ofERISA §404(a)(1)(A)-(C) require that
plan fiduciaries act prudently and use plan assets solely for the purpose of
paying plan expenses and reasonable plan benefits.47 A fiduciary may satisfy
these obligations by following a "procedurally prudent" process in which the
fiduciary employs appropriate methods to investigate and determine the merits
of a particular course of action and then acts accordingly. Generally, such a
process requires the impartial study of-the transaction's advantages and disadvantages, the exercise of diligence in all aspects of the transaction, and the
acquisition and reliance upon up-to-date information. In following a proce43.
44.
45.

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BX1)(i).
Id.
29 C.FL § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BX2).

46. 29 CF.R. § 2550.404c-l(bX2Xi)(BXlXviii).
47. Similar standards apply to the Thrift Savings Board, 5 U.S.C. § 8477(b) (2000), and
to the Florida State Board of Administration. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.4501(15Xa), 112.656

(West 2001).
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durally prudent process, fiduciaries must retain qualified experts and consultants whenever fiduciaries do not possess the skills to conduct an adequate
investigation. Fiduciaries typically engage consultants to assist in the establishment of investment policies, to evaluate the quality of proposed providers,
and to develop comparative cost information about the proposed service providers and investment products.
Although ERISA § 404(c) protects plan fiduciaries from liability arising
out of investment decisions made by a participant exercising control over the
participant's assets, the DOL has stated that the act of designating investment
alternatives (including look-through investment vehicles and investment managers) in an ERISA § 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function not protected by
§ 404(c) liability limitations. 48 Thus, all of the ERISA fiduciary provisions
apply to both the initial designation of investment alternatives and to investment managers and the ongoing determination that
such alternatives and
49
managers remain suitable and prudent for the plan.
1. Selection ofInvestment Products
There are several different criteria pertinent to the evaluation of investment products and providers. Fiduciaries should consider the investment performance of selected investment vehicles. Fiduciaries should also consider
the costs and fees ofparticular investments and the extent to which such costs
and fees may affect investment returns.50 Because every investment necessarily causes a plan to forgo other investment opportunities, fiduciaries must
consider the expected return on alternative investments with risks similar to
the plan."' An investment would not be prudent ifthe fiduciary expected such
investment to provide a plan with a lower return than alternative available
investments with commensurate degrees of risk or to be riskier than alternative available investments with commensurate rates of rtrnMS2
A fiduciary should also consider the role of a particular investment in a
plan's portfolio, and thus take into account factors such as diversification,
liquidity, and risk/return characteristics; 3 This evaluation should consider
provisions of the § 404(c) regulations that govern the selection of investment
options for participant-directed plans.'
48. Dep't of LaborAdv. Op. No. 98-04A (May 28,1998).
49. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13,1992) (codified at29 C.F.R. pt 2550).
50. Letter from Bette J. Briggs, Chiet Division of Fiduciary Interpretations, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, to Douglas 0. Kant, FMR Corp. (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Labor).
51.

Dep't ofLaborAdv. Op. No. 98-04A(May 28,1998).

52.

Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering

Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2000).
53. Dep't ofLaborAdv. Op. No. 98-04A (May 28,1998).

54.

See supra Part ILA (discussing § 404(c) regulations).
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The DOL statedthatthe fiduciary standards donotpreclude consideration
ofnon-economic factors ("collateral benefits") in the evaluation ofa particular
investment opportunity, However, collateral benefits may onlybe considered
in the investment choice if the fiduciary expects the investment to provide an
investment return commensurate with other investments of similar risk. 6 Thus,
a fiduciary may not rely upon non-economic factors unless the investment,
judged solely on the basis of its economic value, appears equal to or superior
to alternative investments, considering the diversification, liquidity, and
risk/retum characteristics ofthe investment inthe plan's investment portfolio.
Plan fiduciaries could offer a "socially responsible" investment fund only
if the fund, when judged solely on the basis of its economic value, would be
equal to or superior to alternative available investments. 57 Similarly, it is arguablethatfiduciaries cannot offer investmentproducts or services to participants
(even if requested by participants) to the extent that such products or services
are inconsistent with the objective of accumulating retirement plan benefits on
behalf of participants. For example, fiduciaries may refuse to offer high-risk
investment products even though participants may request such products.
2. Selection ofInvestment Service Providers
A plan services selection process that is procedurally prudent requires an
investigation into the requirements of the plan and its participants. Once the
investigation establishes such requirements, the fiduciary may select plan
investment and service arrangements, taking into account the cost of services,
the quality of services, and the qualifications of the provider.58 The fiduciary
must also evaluate the performance and suitability of investment choices. In
addition, some special considerations apply in the context of service arrangements that combine investment and administrative services into a single,
"bundled" service arrangement.5 9
55.

Dep'tofLaborAdv. Op. No. 98-04A (May 28,1998).

56.
57.

Id.
Id.

58.

See Letter from Bette J. Briggs, Chief, Division of Fiduciary Interpretations, U.S.

Dep't of Labor, to Diana Ceresi, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SEIU, AFICIO, CLC (Feb. 19, 1998)
(on file with U.S. Dep't of Labor) [hereinafter Briggs 1998 Letter] (discussing standards applicable to selection of health care providers); Letter from Bette J. Briggs, Chief, Division of Fidu-

ciary Interpretations, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Theodore Konshak, Negotiated Pension Plans,

Ltd. (Dec. 1, 1997) (on file with U.S. Dep't of Labor) (discussing criteria applicable to selecting
plan actuary); see also Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that
fiduciary trustees have obligation to select provider whose service level, quality, and fees best
match plan's needs and financial situation); McLaughlin v. Bendersky, 705 F. Supp. 417,420
(N.D. nM 1989) (stating that measurement of fiduciary's duty is one of objective reasonableness
with respect to cost of plan services relative to quality of such services).
59. See supra text at Part ILA.2.6 (stating that responsibility of plan fiduciaries to select,
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a. Identification ofPlan Requirements
The first step of a procedurally prudent process for selecting plan service
arrangements is the evaluation of the needs of the plan and its participants.
A DOL brochure prepared for fiduciaries who select investments and services
for participant-directed plans subject to ERISA (the "Employer Brochure")
explains that employers should consider the specific services that the plan
requires. Such considerations include the type and frequency of reports, the
requisite communications to participants, the necessary educational materials
and meetings for participants, the availability and frequency of participant

investment transfers, the level of responsibility the service provider will
assume, and the optional features involved, such as loans, Internet trading, and
telephone transfers. 60 Similarly, courts have held that fiduciaries who select
plan service arrangements must determine the needs of the plan's participants
and take such needs into account in the determination of what service
6 level,
quality, and fees best match the plan's needs and financial situation. '
b. Costs
In the Employer Brochure, the DOL explains that the cost of plan services, including investment services, is a key consideration in selecting plan
investments and services. Specifically, the Employer Brochure provides the
following: "Understanding fees and expenses is important in providing for the
services necessary for your plan's operation. This responsibility is ongoing.
After careful evaluation during the initial selection; the plan's fees and expenses should be monitored to determine whether they continue to be reasonable." 62 To further emphasize the importance of cost considerations, the Employer Brochure explains that "[flees and expenses can have a significant
impact on your employees' retirement savings."'6 The Employer Brochure
also provides ten questions that employers may use to focus their evaluation
of the fees and expenses that the plan may pay.6
review, and monitor investment alternatives is unclear when alternatives, as in case of some
SDOs, are not "designated" under § 404(c) regulation).
60. U.S. DEP'TOFLABOR,ALOOKAT401(K)PLANFEES ...
FOREMPLOYBES, available
at http'/www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/publicfpubs/401kt700.htm (last visited Oct 19, 2001) [hereinafter 401(K) PLAN FEES].
61. See Liss, 991 F. Supp. at 300 (stating that trustees are obligated to determine needs
of plan participants, review services and fees of providers, and to select provider best matching
needs and financial situation of plan); Whitfield v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287, 1304
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that fiduciary obligation includes consideration of participant needs).
62. 401(K) PLAN FES, supranote 60.
63. Id.
64. Id. These questions include the following:
Do you know which fees and expenses are charged directly to the plan and which
are deducted from investment returns?
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DOL interpretations suggest tha fiduciaries should evaluate plan fees in
light of the '"otal cost" resulting from the provider's services, including those
costs associated with investment and administrative services.65 In connection
with the Employer Brochure, the DOL issued an optional uniform fee disclosure format (the "401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form"), which fiduciaries may
use to determine the "total cost" of services associated with a plan.' According to the form, fiduciaries may compare investment product fees and plan
administration expenses charged by competing providers, regardless of how
the particular service providers structure fees, through a determination of a
plan's "total cost."67

Although cost is a key factor that fiduciaries should consider when selecting plan investments and services arrangements, it is not the only factor of
concern.'s As the Employer Brochure explains, "[c]heaper is not necessarily
better." 69 In the introduction to the 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form, the

Department of Labor explains:
Selecting a service provider requires that you evaluate and differentiate
services offered by competing companies. Cost is one of the criteria, but
not the only criterion, for making this evaluation. Other factors of equal
or greater importance to consider include the quality and type of services
provided, the anticipated performance of competing providers and their
investment products and other factors specific to your plan's needs. The
Do you understand that some investment options have higher fees than others
because of the nature of the investment?
Does the prospective arrangement have any restrictions, such as charges for early
termination of your relationship with the provider?
Have you considered asking potential providers to present uniform fee information
that includes all fees charged?

Id.
65.
66.

See generally401(K) PLAN REES, supra note 60.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WAlFARE BENEFITS ADMmNSThATION, 401(K)
PLAN FEE DISCLOSURE FORM, at 1, available at http'//www.dol.gov/cgi-bin/consolid.pl?media
+reports (last visited Jan. 14,2002).
67. Id.
68. Indeed, some DOL interpretations and cases indicate that it may be imprudent for
fiduciaries to consider only cost in the selection of service providers. See Interpretive Bulletin
Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA When Selecting an Annuity Provider, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(d) (stating that "increased costs could never justify putting the benefits of
annuitized participants and beneficiaries at risk by purchasing an unsafe annuity"); Briggs 1998
Letter, supra note 58 (explaining that plan fiduciaty's failure to consider quality in selecting
health services provider may be breach of fiduciary duty); see also Bussian v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 223 F3d 286, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n annuity's price cannot be the motivating factor
until the fiduciary reasonably determines, through prudent investigation, that the providers
under consideration are comparable in their ability to promote the interests of participants and
beneficiaries.").
69. 401(K) PLAN FE'S, supra note 60.
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serviceprovideroffering the lowestcostservicesisnotnecessarilythebest
choiceforyour plan.0
c. Quality of Services/ProviderQualifications

The DOL's Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit
Plans has issued a report that explains how fiduciaries should select plan
service providers. 1 This report indicates that fiduciaries should consider the
following matters in the evaluation of the quality of services: the service provider's objective qualifications to provide services, including business structure, size of staff, relevant education, professional certifications and experience, references, professional registrations (ifapplicable), technical capability, financial condition and capitalization, pending enforcement actions or litigation, and the reasons why the service provider has been terminated by
others; the provider's track record for delivering accurate and timely recordkeeping and other administrative services and insuring regulatory compliance;
whether the service provider is financially stable and committed to the business for the long term; whether the provider offers a wide range of options
that will allow participants to make appropriate asset allocation objectives and
achieve their investment objectives; the provider's demonstrated ability to
generate superior investment performance over time; the provider's administrative capability to provide assistance with matters such as employee enrollment, investment education, and ongoing communication, whether the provider's service representatives are knowledgeable and dependable; and procedures in place to ensure that any mistakes by the provider will be disclosed
to the fiduciary and corrected. 2
d. Bundled Service Arrangements
Service providers supply "bundled service" arrangements that combine
services such as custodial duties, recordkeeping duties, plan administration,
and plan investment choices. Under some bundled service arrangements, providers offer certain "free" services if fiduciaries purchase other services
(usually investment management services) that the provider offers.
In the case of these arrangements, the DOL recognizes that plan fiduciaries are entitled to review the arrangement in its entirety, as opposed to an
individual evaluation of each component. 3 For example, fiduciaries may
70. 401(K) PLAN FEES, supra note 60.
71.
ADVISORYCOUNCLONEMPLOYEEWELFARE&PENSIONBENEFITPLANS,REPORTOF
niH WoR NG GROUP oN GUImANcE IN Sm.CTING & MoNroRiNG SERvIcE PROvERs,

available athttp//www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/adcoun/srvpro/htm (last visited Nov. 6,2001).
72.

Id.

73.

See ABA Joint Committee on Employee Benefits, Q&A Session with U.S. Depart-
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review the reasonableness of the entire fee charged under a bundled service
arrangement instead of analyzing the amount paid for each particular service. 4
Nevertheless, plan fiduciaries should compare the costs of a bundled service
arrangement with the cost of equivalent bundled programs or separately
procured services and funds." The "total cost" approach taken in the 401(k)
Plan Fee Disclosure Form can facilitate such comparison.
The DOL has also agreed that plan fiduciaries may consider the value of
"one-stop shopping," or the administrative convenience and associated benefits of a single bundled arrangement, in the selection of a bundled service
arrangement. 6 The DOL recognizes that the fiduciary may sometimes accept
lesser quality of the plan's funds by doing so, provided that the investments
meet a "basic" prudence standard.77 In this situation, fiduciaries have the

discretion to determine what combination of investment products and services
best serves the plan."'
ERISA's prohibited transaction rules generally prohibit bundled providers from providing participants of ERISA-covered plans investment "advice"
with respect to their own products. 79 Indeed, DOL officials have commented
that a bundled provider's interest in the success of its investment products

may affect its ability to provide unbiased investment advice. In recent years
ment of Labor, Answer 16 (May 11, 1994) (stating that "[o]ne can look at the entire fee so there
is no need to analyze each separate fee in the bundled services" for reasonableness).
74. Id.
75. Letter from Bette J. Briggs, Chief, Division of Fiduciary Interpretations, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, to Douglas 0. Kank, FMR Corp. (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file 'with U.S. Dep't of Labor).
76. ABA Joint Committee on Employee Benefits, Q&A Session with U.S. Department
of Labor, Answer 17 (May 11, 1994).
77. Id.
78. See id. ("The determination of what combination is best must be made by the appropriate plan fiduciary.").
79. See 29 C.F.R. § 25103.21(c) (1994) (discussing ability of fiduciary to render investment advice to plan participant); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1994) (defining plan fiduciary).
Interpretations of ERISA distinguish between investment information and education programs
and "investment advice." For example, the DOL views general discussions about financial
planning concepts, objective descriptions of investment options, and asset allocation models
provided under certain conditions as investment education. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating
to Participant Investment Education, 29 CF.R. § 2509.96-1 (2000) (setting out general criteria
that DOL will consider when determining whether plan fiduciary provides investment advice

or investment education). On the other hand, when a participant receives individualized recommendations and there is an oral or written agreement that the participant may rely on such
recommendations when making investment decisions, "investment advice" may have been provided. See 29 C.F.,. § 2510.3-21(c) (2000) (setting out criteria for determining when person
gives independent advice). Under ERISA, a person that provides investment advice will be
deemed to be a fiduciary and may be responsible for losses and may have to disgorge profits
resulting from the advice. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1994) (defining plan fiduciary).

1368

58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1353 (2001)

the DOL has issued individual exemptions from ERISA's prohibited transaction rules for programs offering advisory services to participants only if either
an independent third-party provides the advice or if a "fee-leveling" arrangement reduces the bundled providers' conflict in providing advice. ° However,
some existing class exemptions issued by the DOL allow for provision of
investment advice by mutual fund underwriters and investment advisors with
respect to their own products under certain conditions, including disclosure
and consent. 1

11I. Conclusion
If Social Securitytransforms whollyorpariallyinto an individual account
system, participants will assume some degree of the investment risk for their

investment decisions. In order to protect participants and to relieve pressures
upon the U.S. government to make up the difference of participants' invest-

ment losses, this Article recommends that legislators examine protective DOL
regulations and ERISA rulings and incorporate them into any new Social
Security legislation.

80. See Dep't of Labor Adv. Op. No. 97-15A (May 22, 1997), availableat http'/www.
dol.gov/dolpwba/publiclprogmmB/ori/advisory97/97-15ahtin (stating that fee-leveling arrangement that eliminates bundled provider's pecuniary interest in advising certain investments
would avoid violation of ERISA's prohibited transactions rules); Olena Berg, Washington
Update: DOL Sets the RecordStraighton InvestmentAdvice,401(K)ALRT (May 1998), at 2,
3 (stating that if"a plan sponsor offers participants a single session with a third-party investment
advisor, and the plan sponsor and the advisor make it clear that they do not intend participants
to use this single session as the primary basis fbr deciding how to invest, it would not be considered to be investment advice leading to fiduciary status").
81.
See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24, amending and superceding Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 77-9,49 Fed. Reg. 13,208 (Apr. 3,1984) (providing relief for purchase
or sale of securities issued by investment company when investment company underwriter also
provides advice to plan); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4,42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (Apr. 8,
1977) (providing relief for sale or purchase of shares of registered open-end investment company when investment advisor is plan fiduciary and is not employer of employees covered by
plan).

